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Essay

The Federalist Papers and the
Constitution of the United States*
BY

PETER

E. QUINT**

INTRODUCTION

Unlike many modern constitutions, the Constitution of the
United States was not a direct product of social or political
cataclysm. The Articles of Confederation were adopted under
the pressures of the Revolutionary War, but the Constitution
was drafted six years after the end of that struggle-not in
response to great military events or political upheavals, but
rather out of deep dissatisfaction with the operations of government under the Articles. The proposed Constitution, therefore,
afforded the Americans an opportunity to establish a government through considered judgment rather than on the basis of
"accident and force'"-"in time of profound peace, by the
' 2
voluntary consent of a whole people.
Although it was "the People" who adopted the Constitution,
it was not the people in a simple undifferentiated body: the
original English settlers had founded separate colonies, and it

* This essay is a revised version of a paper presented at the Second World Congress
of the International Association of Constitutional Law in Paris and Aix-en-Provence,
August-September 1987.
** Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. A.B. 1961, LL.B.
1964, Harvard University; Dipl. in Law 1965, Oxford University.
Tm FEDBRILIST No. 1, at 33 (A. Hamilton) (all citations to The Federalist are
from Rossiter ed. 1961).
2 Tim FEDMLIST No. 85, at 527 (A. Hamilton).
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was these political units-now individual states-that claimed
the primary allegiance of most Americans in 1787. Thus the
Framers of the Constitution were confronted not only with
various economic and social interests, but also with the disparate
political interests of the respective states. In the period after
1776 almost all of the states had adopted constitutions to replace
the former colonial charters, and experience under these documents furnished examples-some of them cautionary-for the
drafters of the new federal Constitution.
Perhaps because the Constitution was proposed in a period
of relative calm, and because the Americans' capacity for political debate had been enlarged by the experience under the state
constitutions, the proposed document evoked a torrent of discussion in newspapers and pamphlets on basic political principles
and their application in the current context. These essays and
pamphlets, both supporting and opposing the proposed constitution, reflected the view that problems of political organization
were subject to resolution through conscious human choice.
Indeed, a striking feature of this literature is the assumption
that the citizens of the new states had the power to determine
their own political destiny. A sense of the possibilities of selfcreation emerges with great clarity in these documents.
The debate surrounding the ratification of the Constitution
reflected deep political struggles. The Constitution established a
strong central government with an independent executive and
judiciary, institutions unknown to the Articles of Confederation.
The federal Congress was granted authority to regulate commerce, and to levy taxes and raise armies directly-rather than
through requisitions mediated by the states. Moreover, the states
were prohibited from issuing paper money and enacting laws
that impaired the obligation of contract. These provisions protected the interests of stability and property.
In contrast, debtors and the dispossessed, and those favoring
more decentralized government in general, believed that their
interests and views would be disregarded. Cutting across these
opposed economic and social interests was the fear of the small
states that the large states would gain control of the federal
apparatus, and the concern of the large states that their greater
contributions to the joint enterprise would not be sufficiently
recognized. Another set of political conflicts, dividing the North
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and the South, revolved to some extent around commercial
interests but also focused on the South's deeply controversial
institution of slavery.
The Constitutional Convention sought to resolve some of
these problems through compromise. First, by granting power
to Congress in limited areas, the Convention sought to confide
a measure of extensive authority to the central government while
retaining significant power in the states. Second, by allowing
representation by population in the House of Representatives
but retaining equal representation of the states in the Senate,
the framers sought to achieve a balance between the large and
small states. Slavery was reluctantly acknowledged and in significant ways supported in the constitutional text; it thus remained an issue for later struggles.
The new Constitution needed the votes of at least nine state
conventions for ratification, and the decision in many states was
close. Opponents of the Constitution, who came to be known
as the Anti-Federalists, were as sedulous as its advocates in
propagating their views. 3 To influence the result in the important
state of New York, three prominent supporters of the Constitution undertook to write a series of newspaper articles explaining and supporting its underlying principles. The authors were
among the paragons of an extraordinary generation: Alexander
Hamilton, one of Washington's aides-de-camp in the Revolutionary War, was to become the first Secretary of the Treasury;
James Madison, a leader of the Constitutional Convention, later
became the fourth President of the United States; John Jay,
architect of the Treaty of Paris, was soon to be appointed the
nation's first Chief Justice. 4 The work of these authors contained
its share of political polemics and occasionally Showed traces of
the haste with which it was composed. Nonetheless, their essays,
first published under the pseudonym "Publius" and later collected as The Federalist, constituted a trenchant defense of a
cautious form of republicanism in a tradition of political writing
that descended from the ancients. In sum, The Federalist rep-

ALIST

' For the views of the opponents, see H. SToRsu1o, THE
(1981).

CompLETE ANTI-FEDER-

4 On the careers of Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, see R. Mosmus,
WrTnEssEs AT
nM CREAMON (1985).
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resents the classic explanation and defense of the Constitution
in its original form. 5
I.

THE

FEDERALIST: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The authors of The Federalistrepresented a striking combination of Calvinist and Enlightenment thought. 6 Their Calvinist
views are reflected in the position, seen throughout the essays,
that human nature as revealed in political life is deeply and
significantly flawed. Whereas political actions should rest on a
desire to further the common good, in reality the political acts
of individuals are often founded on "interest" and "passion,"
impulses that can give rise to reflective or unreflective selfpreference. 7 In politics these "interests" or "passions" sometimes coalesce in the organized form of "factions," groups that
seek to control a political structure not for the advancement of
the general good but in a manner that is "adverse to the rights
of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of
the community." ' 8 These moral infirmities lie deep within the
nature of human beings, and are therefore, for all practical
purposes, ineradicable. 9 It is this fallen nature-the sad fact that
men are not angels, as Madison put it in one of the most brilliant
passages of The Federalist'°-that requires the institution of
government.
Fortunately, however, a government that can restrain these
ineradicable human traits is possible through the exercise of the
faculty of reason. It is here that the authors of The Federalist
are representatives of a more optimistic strand of Enlightenment

5
6

(1949).

See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 418 (1821).
Cf. Wright, The Federalist on the Nature of Political Man, 59 ETIcs 1, 29

. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 6, at 56-57, No. 15, at 109-10 (A.
Hamilton);

see generally, Wright, supra note 6; Howe, The Political Psychology of The Federalist,
44 Wm. & MARY Q. 485 (1987). The authors of The Federalistdid not believe, however,
that human nature was so corrupt that individuals would never act to favor the common
good. Rather, the authors believed that in most cases the bad would outweigh the good
motives. See M. Wm, PHImosoPHY, The FederalistAND Ta CONSTTUTION 91-101, 123,
126-27 (1987); see also infra note 45.
THm FEDERALST No. 10, at 78 (J. Madison).
T
9 Id. at 78-79.
10 Tim FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (J. Madison).
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thought, which balanced the authors' pessimistic view of human
nature." Reason, if properly employed, can construct a governmental system that will at least mitigate the serious dangers posed
by the passions of human nature and promote individual rights
and the happiness of the people at large. 12 Behind this view lies
a rough-hewn utilitarianism, which saw the diffusion of happi3
ness as a central goal of government.'
Human reason, however, is not so strong that it can operate
completely in the abstract. One cannot reason directly from the
system established by the Constitution to the success (or failure)
of its future operation without the aid afforded by "experience."
The probable success or failure of various devices for the suppression of passion, interest, and faction can be evaluated only
through comparison with concrete historical examples. The wealth
of these examples-and the ingenuity with which they are employed-is one of the most striking features of the The Federalist. Some of the examples are drawn from the classical history
of Greece and Rome, which furnishes an abundant record of
the successes and failures ofancient federations and republics.
Other examples reflect events of more recent European historythe circumstances and conditions that, in a general sense, formed
the background of the American Revolution. A third source of

" For a discussion of Madison as a figure of the Enlightenment, see D. ADAIR,
FOUNDING FATHERS (1974).

James Madison, in F.mE AND TBE

12See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 110 (A. Hamilton): "Why has government
been instituted at all? Because the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of
reason and justice without constraint"; see also Howe, supra note 7, at 509; Wright,
supra note 6, at 28; Barber, Judicial Review and The Federalist, 55 U. Cm. L. REv.
836, 884-87 (1988). But the capacity of reason to control passion is precarious: "[Tihe
mild voice of reason, pleading the cause of an enlarged and permanent interest, is but
too often drowned, before public bodies as well as individuals, by the clamors of an
impatient avidity for immediate and immoderate gain." THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 268
(J. Madison). Nonetheless, the authors of The Federalistwrite as though the drafters of
the Constitution (and the authors themselves) possessed the ability to understand and to
convey the dictates of reason. Perhaps this is because the unique experience of the
Revolution suppressed disorderly political passions, and thereby encouraged reason, in
an entire generation. Cf. Barber, supra, at 852, 878 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 49 (J.
Madison)). Yet, because opponents of the Constitution were also members of the
"revolutionary generation," the authors of The Federalist must have believed that the
supporters of the Constitution were particularly well-favored in this regard. See M.
WmTE, supra note 7, at 114-15.
" See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 288-89 (J. Madison) (Political institutions
must be subordinate to the happiness of the people.).
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history was even more immediate: developments in the American
states under the Articles of Confederation furnished some of the
most vivid cautionary details.' 4 In the historical discussion an
implicit pattern of argument is sometimes evident: history presents cases in which the flaws of human nature threaten to bring
about the triumph of passion, interest, or faction. In some cases
these dangerous traits prevail; in others, they are restrained by
human reason in the form of wise governmental institutions.
Whether an institution succeeded or failed in this way can furnish an argument for its use (or rejection) in the Constitution
of the United States.
In one sense these are historical arguments, because they
draw from the materials of history. In another sense, however,
these arguments are fundamentally ahistorical because they assume that political problems are the same in all times and places
and that the institutions that succeed in suppressing passion and
promoting the public good in one setting will also be effective
in others. 15 Although the authors were students of Montesquieu
in some respects, they generally disregarded his view that climate,
geography, and other exogenous factors could alter human activities and attitudes in various times and places.
II.

THE FEDERALIST: STRUCTURE AND BAsIC THEms

Against this theoretical background Publius sought to convince his readers of the virtues and the necessity of the new
Constitution. The pursuit of this task is undertaken in two major
sections. In the .first section, Publius examines the relations
between the federal government and the states and supports
extensive federal power as a means of furthering public happiness and checking dangers of faction, which are more likely to

14 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 6, at 56 (A. Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST No. 21,
at 140 (A. Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST No. 25, at 166-67 (A. Hamilton) (citing Shays'
Rebellion, an uprising in Massachusetts in 1786-87, as an example of the dangers of
insurrection that can threaten governments).
,1 See, e.g., Introduction to Tan FEDERALIST (M. Beloff, ed. 1948), quoted in G.
DIETzE, TB FEDERALIST: A CLAssIc ON FEDERALISM AND FRE GovRNsEN.rr 26-28 (1960)
(noting The Federalist's "unawareness of history as a continuing process"); see also M.
WmiTE, supra note 7, at 48-49 (Publius treated past and present historical examples as

being of equal weight.).
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arise in the smaller political societies of the states. Yet strong
central power raises its own dangers, and in the second section
Publius examines the structure and institutions of the federal
government to show that this system can restrain the encroachments of the federal departments, while leaving basic representative institutions intact.
A.

The Federal Government and the States

The initial question for Publius, as for the people themselves,
was whether there should be a union of the thirteen states at
all. Montesquieu had argued that a republic is impossible over
an extended area, and some opponents of the Constitution apparently contended that a number of smaller confederations
should be preferred. 16 In the initial papers the authors asserted
the immense practical advantages of union: enhanced commercial strength' 7 and greater safety against attack and
insurrection's-virtues that would contrast sharply with the military weakness and fiscal and commercial infirmity that afflicted
the confederation under the Articles. Smaller confederations,
moreover, would lead to rivalries and war among the confederations; and constant mutual suspicion would require dangerous
standing armies. 9
The authors' main point, however, was a more fundamental
one: paradoxically, an extended confederation is actually necessary for a successful republic. 20 First, in an extended republic
,6 THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 73, No. 13, at 97 (A. Hamilton); see also I H.

supra note 3, at 15-23 (discussing the Anti-Federalist argument that "free,
republican governments could extend only over a relatively small territory with a homogeneous population").
THE FEDERALST No. 11 (A. Hamilton).
Tm FEDERAlUST Nos. 4 (J. Jay), 9 (A. Hamilton).
29 See Tim FEDERALISr Nos. 7, 8 (A. Hamilton). Portions of these papers seem to
anticipate the struggles of the American Civil War. In contrast, in The Federalist No.
14, Madison invokes the mutual sympathy of the people of America, "knit together as
STORING,

they are by so many cords of affection," in a passage that seems to prefigure the closing
paragraph of President Lincoln's First Inaugural Address. See TRm FEDERALIST No. 14,
at 103-04 (J. Madison); IV THm COLLECTED WoRKs OF AmBtrRA LINCOLN 271 (R. Basler
ed. 1953).
20 This is the famous argument of TBE FEDERALtsT No. 10 (J. Madison), which
has become a focal point of discussion of The Federalist in the twentieth century. See
generally D. ADAm, The Tenth FederalistRevisited, in FAME AND m FouNDN G FA-
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the population from which a more or less fixed number of
officers is to be chosen increases substantially; consequently, the
chances of finding and electing persons of high caliber-persons
less than ordinarily affected by self-seeking passions or interests-will be greater. Moreover, and perhaps most important, in
an extended confederation the moderating influence of a large
population and disparate interests distributed over a broad area
will deprive self-seeking factions and dangerous individuals of
the opportunities for success that they might have in a democracy
or republic of smaller scope. Because factions will ordinarily be
confined to political communities of limited size, a larger compound area, such as that of the United States, would necessarily
encompass a number of contending factional groups. Thus, the
mediating effect of the clash of factions in this larger society
would prevent any single faction from achieving control. This
view, which relies on the moderating effect of contending forces,
is echoed in later papers on the clash of "departments" within
the federal government and is one of the basic themes of The
Federalist.21 More generally, the importance of government as a
device for moderating extreme views and actions is paralleled by
an emphasis on moderation as a virtue in many other passages
of The Federalist.
Perhaps the greatest strength of the central government under
the new Constitution lay in Congress's authority to raise taxes
and armies by proceeding directly against individuals, instead of
being limited to levying requisitions against the states. 22 Con-

11 (discussing various interpretations of THE FEDERALIST No. 10
throughout American history). For the use of THE FEDERALIST No. 10 in an "economic
interpretation" of the Constitution, see C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913); see also I V. PARRINGTON, MAIN
CURRENTS IN AmR icAN THOUGHT 267-291 (1958) (important critical discussion of The
Federalist, influenced by Beard). The contributions of Beard and Parrington are trenchantly analyzed in Adair's essay, supra.
21 See M. WHITE, supra note 7, at 159-66. For a similar point in the context of
foreign affairs, see also THE FEDERALIST No. 3 (J. Jay) (While the passions in a single
state may lead to hostility with other nations, a national government is likely to take a
more balanced and moderate view.).
2 Publius viewed this new power, also, as a device through which reason would
further public happiness by limiting the baneful force of passion. Under the Articles of
Confederation, Congress could generally proceed against the states, but not against
individuals, and that system made it too easy for the passions and ambitions of factions
THERS, supra note
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gress, however, was not accorded the power to regulate individuals in every way, but could only legislate on those "objects"
confided to it in the constitutional text. All other regulatory
powers remained in the states. Yet the "objects" of federal
power are described in very general terms, and a fundamental
debate centered on the extent of Congress's discretion in legislating to achieve these ends.
In an argument destined to have continuing importance,
Publius pressed the Federalist case for a broad interpretation of
national power: where power over certain "objects" is granted
to Congress, that body must have extensive discretion in determining how its own authority should be exercised. Grants of
power to the federal government are intended for the indefinite
future-Publius clearly saw the Constitution as creating a permanent governmental structure-and it is impossible to determine in advance the exigencies that will require special exertions
of that power. Indeed, the exercise of any given power must be
proportionate to the specific historical instances that evoke its
exercise, and these circumstances cannot be foretold in advance.
Congress must consequently retain the broadest possible authority to determine a proportionate exercise of power under the
specific circumstances that it faces2 3 Thus the Framers were
right in not restricting Congress's power by prohibiting standing
armies in peacetime or limiting the federal taxing power to
specified forms or subjects of taxation-two prominent AntiFederalist demands. 24 Yet the failure to place explicit restrictions
on congressional power over the "objects" of national legislation
does not mean that the federal power in those areas is actually
unlimited; the structure of the federal government and its ulticontrolling the states to avoid compliance with federal measures for the general good.
See, e.g., TIm FEDERALIST No. 15, at 111-13 (A. Hamilton).
2 See Tim FEDERALISr Nos. 31, 34 (A. Hamilton); see also M. WHITE, Tim
PHLosopiry OF Tim AmmiucAN REVOLUTION 78-94 (1978). The authors' emphasis on
proportionality in discussing federal power seems to echo their emphasis on moderation
in other parts of the work. Proportionality can be viewed as a form of moderation-a
response that is appropriate to the events evoking the response, without being either too
strong or too weak.
14 The Constitution did, however, limit to two years the permissible duration of
appropriations for the army. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. For Anti-Federalist attacks
on standing armies, see, e.g., Essays by a [Maryland]Farmer, 5 H. STORING, supra note
3, at 22-28.
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mate control by the people will furnish an effective means of
restraint.

25

Thus, one important limit on extensive federal power will be
the vigilance of the people themselves, and the authors take
pains to emphasize the strictly republican nature of the national
government. 26 Yet if the people are to check improper taxation,
opponents argued, the legislature established by the Constitution

will not be large enough to encompass the numerous social and
economic groups whose distinct interests will be affected. 27 Publius acknowledges that few members of the less powerful classes

are likely to be elected to the legislature, but he argues that they
will be adequately represented, through an identity of interests,
by representatives of the more prosperous classes. 2 The merchant class, for example, will broadly represent "mechanics"
and "manufacturers" (that is, various forms of artisans) 29 and
"middling" landowners will represent the interests of all other
landowners, great and small. Moreover, members of the "learned

professions," without a distinct interest of their own, may enjoy
the confidence of all and may therefore represent all 3 0 Thus an
elite political structure is justified through a form of economic
and social "virtual representation."
In their task of investigating and checking the federal government the people will have as allies the governmental organs
of the States. Indeed, Madison argues that the combined mass

2 THE FEDERALIST Nos. 31, 33 (A. Hamilton); see also TnE FEDERALiST Nos. 24,
25 (A. Hamilton). These papers foreshadow the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), which acknowledges the broad
discretion of Congress to choose the means that it considers appropriate in legislating
on the "objects" confided to it. The Federalist'sargument and Marshall's opinion are
also similar in according a minor role to the "necessary and proper" clause of art. I, §
8, which is viewed by both as adding little to the inherently broad nature of delegated
power under a written constitution. See THE FEDERALIsT Nos. 33, at 201-03 (A. Ham-

ilton); 44, at 283-86 (J. Madison). For a discussion of this section of the papers, see D.
EPsTEiN, THE PoLrrcA. THEORY OF The Federalist40-50 (1984).
26

TBE

FEDERALIST

No. 39 (. Madison).

21See, e.g., Samuel Chase, Notes of Speeches Delivered to the MarylandRatifying
Convention, 5 H. SToRING, supra note 3, at 89-90 ("only the gentry, the rich and well
born will be elected."); Essay by a Georgian, id. at 130 (fearing aristocratic government).
21

See THE FEDERALIST No. 35 (A. Hamilton).
On the meaning of these terms, see G. STOURZH,

THE IDEA OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT

See Tan

FEDERALIST

88-89 (1970).

No. 35, at 215 (A. Hamilton).

ALEXANDER HAmLTON AND
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of federal power will not endanger the state governments, because the "natural attachment ' 3 ' of the people, and their "predilection and probable support, "32 will inevitably favor the states
in comparison with the distant federal government. Consequently, the organized state governments would assist the people
to repel any measures of oppression attempted by the national
government.33 The first portion of The Federalistthus concludes
with an argument that extensive federal power will promote
public happiness and suppress the effects of faction in the states,
without unduly impairing the states' independent status.
B.

The Structure of the Federal Government

Having discussed the allocation of authority between the
federal government and the states, the authors turn to the second
great division of authority in the American Constitution: the
distribution of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches within the federal government. Here, in Montesquieu's doctrine of separated powers, lay a primary safeguard
against the oppressive use of strong federal power.3 4 The AntiFederalists argued, however, that the Constitution disregarded
Montesquieu's doctrine and raised the spectre of tyrannical consolidation by "mixing" the powers of the three branches-for
example, by allowing the President to veto legislation and empowering the legislature to impeach and remove executive officers. 35 As in his argument in The FederalistNo. 10 on the size
of republics, Publius (Madison in both cases) sought to show
that the very opposite of the view attributed to Montesquieu was
actually correct. First, according to Madison, Montesquieu sought
only to prohibit the exercise of all the power of one branch by
another branch-a degree of consolidation that was certainly not
present in the proposed Constitution.36 Even more important,

3 THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 294 (J. Madison).
11Ti FEDERALIST No. 45, at 290 (J.Madison).
3 See THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (J.Madison).
34 THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J.Madison).
3 See, e.g., G. WOOD, Tm CREATION OF THE AmICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at

548 (1969).
36 According to Madison, Montesquieu "did not mean that [the governmental]
departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over, the acts of each
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however, was Madison's argument that a partial "mixture" of
separated governmental powers is actually necessary in order to
preserve the basic separation of powers and thus to preserve
liberty. If a constitution merely separates governmental powers,
the system is unlikely to function because "the encroaching spirit
of power" will disregard mere "parchment barriers." Rather,
37
according to Madison, "auxiliary precautions" are necessary.
The necessary "auxiliary precaution" found in the Constitution is the authority of one branch to "check" the actions of
another branch-for example, by withholding consent to actions
on which both must agree. This device will be effective in
preserving the powers of all branches intact because, here, passion will be made to do the work of reason: the personal ambition that will lead one department to resent and resist the
encroachments of another will be combined with adequate "constitutional means"-that is, the authority to check certain actions of the other department-in order to create a system in
which each branch will be restricted to its own proper sphere.
Thus, the ambition or passion of individuals, which unconfined
may have a ruinous effect, can be channeled through a device
contrived by reason to a beneficial end. In sum, "the private
interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public
3 8
rights."
Because the legislature necessarily predominates in any republic, it is important to take special measures to check that
branch; the Constitution accordingly divides Congress into two
different branches and requires the consent of both for legislation.3 9 The division between the federal government and the

other." Rather, Montesquieu intended to say only "that where the whole power of one
department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another
department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted." THE
FEDERALST No. 47, at 302-03 (J. Madison).
37 THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308-09 (J. Madison); THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at
322 (J. Madison). Sometimes it might be possible to turn to the people to resist
governmental abuses; but decisions of the people in a constitutional crisis are likely to
partake more of "passion" than "reason" and might indeed support the encroachments
of power. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 317 (J. Madison); see also THE FEDERALIST No.
50 (J. Madison).
31 TiE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (J.Madison); see Barber, supra note 12, at 849.
31 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (J.Madison). Invoking the experience of some
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states adds a further safeguard to the security thus created. 40 As
the safeguard of extended territory in The Federalist No. 10
protects one part of the people against another, the safeguard
of partially separated powers in The Federalist No. 51 protects
41
the people against governmental oppression.
After analyzing the general structure of the national government, Publius turns to a discussion of its individual departments
which, although detailed, nonetheless reflects the more general
doctrines of the work. As in the Constitution itself, the order
of discussion proceeds from the most to the least representative
of the governmental branches.
The House of Representatives, elected directly by popular
suffrage, was the most "republican" organ of the government.
The Anti-Federalists argued, however, that even the House would

be oligarchical and remote from the people because of its biennial (rather than annual) election and relatively small size.4
Publius responded that a two-year period allows the representatives to become familiar with the governmental problems of
such an extended nation. 43 On the size of the legislature, the

great problem was to have a number large enough "to secure
the benefits of free consultation and discussion, and to guard

states in the period following the Revolution, Madison argues that the legislature "is
everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous
vortex." THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 309. Although Madison cites the legislature as the
example of an encroaching power, the discussion nonetheless assumes that the legislature
will always be the strongest branch (and properly so) in republican government. See G.
WILLS, ExPLA]nni AmERICA: The Federalist 126-29 (1981).
Tam FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (J. Madison).
' See M. WIE,
supra note 7, at 159-66. Interestingly from a contemporary
perspective, the judiciary is not explicitly mentioned in Tan FEDERALIST No. 51 as an
organ that will keep the other branches within their constitutional limits. Perhaps as the
"least dangerous" branch, the judiciary was not seen as powerful enough to check the
other two branches. On the other hand, the power of judicial review may have been
tacitly included within the general language of Tn FEDERALIST No. 51 as one of the
devices through which one branch would restrain another. See also Wright, supra note
6, at 10 (Tan FEDERALIST No. 51 does not mention courts because Publius thought that
judicial review would be limited to protecting civil liberties only). But see generally
Barber, supra note 12, at 887 (Publius favored judicial power because he believed that
courts embody the value of reason).
42 See, e.g., Letters from The FederalFarmer, 2 H. STORING, supra note 3, at 235,
265-86; Dellinger, 1787: The Constitution and "The Curse of Heaven, " 29 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 145, 149-50 (1987).
41 THE FEDERALIST No. 53 (J. Madison).
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against too easy a combination for improper purposes," but yet
small enough "to avoid the confusion and intemperance of a
multitude" since in large assemblies "passion never fails to wrest
the scepter from reason.'"' Interestingly, the discussion relies on
a degree of confidence in human nature in order to avoid difficulties that the governmental structure itself cannot entirely
control. Certainly, the institution of representation must rest, to
some extent at least, on such a view. 45
The popularly-elected House was thus viewed as the most
powerful branch, and the other three federal organs-Senate,
president and judiciary-were conceived, at least in part, as
republican devices to restrain the popular strength of the House.
For precisely this reason they were the subject of bitter attack
by the Anti-Federalists. The Senate, a small body elected by the
legislatures of the states for a lengthy six-year period, was criticized as carrying within it the seeds of aristocratic tyranny.4
Invoking the example of ancient republics, Publius defends a
small and rather permanent senatorial institution-chosen by
"enlightened and respectable" state legislators-as affording the
necessary judgment and knowledge of affairs to collaborate with
the president in making treaties and to check occasional bursts
of "passion" in the more popular branch.47 The Senate "will

" THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 342 (J. Madison); see also Tim FEDERALIST No. 58,
at 360-61 (J. Madison).
45

As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain
degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other qualities in human
nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican
government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree
than any other form.
Tim FEDERALIST No. 55, at 346 (J. Madison). Nonetheless Publius admits the possibility
that the "cords" of sympathy between the people and their representatives "may all be
insufficient to control the caprice and wickedness of men." Tm FEDERALIST No. 57, at
353 (J. Madison); see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
Another important feature of the composition of the House of Representatives
resulted from the compromise by which slaves were to be counted as 3/5 of other
persons in allocating representatives and direct taxation among the states. A chilling
paper, Tim FEDERALIST No. 54 (J. Madison), seeks to defend this compromise.
46See, e.g., Letters from The FederalFarmer,2 H. STORING, supra note 3, at 288
("Men six years in office absolutely contract callous habits, and cease, in too great a
degree, to feel their dependance [sic], and for the condition of their constituents."); see
generally 1 H. STORING, supra note 3, at 48-49.
' Tim FEDERALIST Nos. 63, at 384 (J. Madison), 64, at 390-91 (J. Jay).
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blend stability with liberty,

'4

and ' 49defend the people "against

the tyranny of their own passions.

It was the presidency, however, with its command of the
armed forces and qualified veto of legislation, that the AntiFederalists saw as representing a particularly dangerous, almost
monarchical, power.50 In response to such arguments, Publius
argued that the executive was a basically republican institution
but also an institution that, like the Senate, represents stability.
In the indirect election of the president-by state electors chosen
by the people-the "sense" of the populace is preserved, but
the actual choice is made through the "deliberation" of "men
most capable of analyzing the [necessary] qualities" under circumstances that will avoid "tumult and disorder" and "cabal,
intrigue, and corruption." 51 Under such a system "there will be
a constant probability of seeing [the office of president] filled
by characters pre-eminent for ability and virtue. "52
Perhaps the most monarchical feature of the executive was
its location in a single officer, the president, rather than in a
group. Hamilton argues that a single executive best promotes
the virtues of "[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch" without sacrificing "due responsibility" and accountability to the
people. 3 A plural executive would degenerate into quarrels and
weakness, but a single executive with a four-year term will be
firm enough to "check excesses in the majority," withstand the
"humors of the legislature," and save the people from their
"temporary delusion." 5 4 The president's qualified veto over leg5
islation will be particularly useful for this purpose.

4 TnE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 385 (J. Madison).
" Id. at 384.
10See, e.g., Letters of Cato, 2 H. SToRING, supra note 3, at 113-18; Essay by a
Farmer and Planter,5 H. SloRiNG, supra note 3, at 76-77 ("a four-years President will
be, in time, a King for life, and after him, his son.... ."); Essay by Tamony, id. at 146
("though not dignified with the magic name of King, he will possess more supreme

power, than Great Britain allows her hereditary monarchs ... ").
See THm FEDERALIST No. 68, at 412 (A. Hamilton).
,2Id. at 414. The history of the American presidency has not confirmed this
sanguine forecast.
, THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 424 (A. Hamilton).
Id. at 425-31; Tm FEDERALIST No. 71, at 432-33 (A. Hamilton).
, TiE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 442-44 (A. Hamilton).
"
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Even though the individual executive will promote "energetic" government, care must be taken to guard against the
excessive passions of that individual. Requiring that the president's salary remain fixed throughout his term 56 will enhance the
president's ability to resist the legislature and prevent corruption
of "his integrity by appealing to his avarice." '5 7 Allowing reelection (as the Constitution does) will make use of the executive's experience and will restrain the "peculation" and usurpation that might be undertaken by an avaricious or ambitious
58
president who knows that he has no hope of further office.
Indeed former presidents, barred from re-election through a
constitutional disability and "wandering among the people like
discontented ghosts," might actually raise the prospect of civil
war.59 In order to enhance political responsibility, the power to
pardon is conferred upon the president alone, 6° but the Senate
is properly associated with the president in making treaties because an avaricious or ambitious individual, if given sole power,
"might be tempted to betray the interests of the state to the
61
acquisition of wealth" or to his own aggrandizement.
Thus even the president may be infected with passions that
must be artificially curbed. Hamilton does note that "the institution of delegated power implies that there is a portion of virtue
and honor among mankind, ' 62 and the indirect choice of the
See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
11TBE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 442 (A. Hamilton).
11THE FEDERALIST No. 72, at 437-38 (A. Hamilton).
39 Id. at 438. Interestingly, Alexis de Tocqueville, who followed The Federalistin
many particulars, vigorously disputed the wisdom of allowing the president to be reelected and did so without necessarily rejecting Hamilton's basic frame of reference.
With the advantage of more than forty years of historical experience, Tocqueville argued
that the prospect of a re-election campaign greatly impaired the president's value as a
check on the "caprices" of the people by making him unduly deferential to the wishes
of the majority. See I A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 136-38 (P. Bradley
ed. 1945).
- THE FEDERALIST No. 74 (A. Hamilton).
36

61

The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of
human virtue which would make it wise in a nation to commit interests of
so delicate and momentous a kind, as those which concern its intercourse
with the rest of the world, to the sole disposal of a magistrate created and
circumstanced as would be a President of the United States.
THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 451 (A. Hamilton).
62

Tan

FEDERALIST

No. 76, at 458 (A. Hamilton).
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president through a complex system of state electors is intended
to further the selection of individuals whose "portion of virtue
and honor" is especially great. What is particularly noteworthy
in this entire discussion, however, is that even though the president's election is carefully filtered through layers of complicated
procedure, it is still necessary to devise further elaborate measures to check the passions that might nonetheless infect even
such a paragon. In this way the discussion of the presidency
reflects the application of reason to the vices of human nature
in order to create an office that combines the executive virtues
of "energy" with the safeguards of republican government.
In the final long section of the The Federalist, Hamilton
discusses the judicial department. 63 Rather than a qualified veto
like that of the executive, the courts possess the power of judicial
review-the power to refuse to enforce a statute that is inconsistent with the Constitution. In exercising this power, however,
the courts are not superior to the legislature. Rather, the people
are superior to both, and the courts must enforce the permanent
will of the people (set forth in the Constitution) against the
temporary will of the people's agents. 64 In light of the courts'
role, permanent judicial tenure (during good behavior) and a
level of compensation that cannot be reduced by Congress are
essential-since "a power over a man's subsistence amounts to
a power over his will. ",a In contrast, Hamilton argues that the
danger of "encroachments" by the courts on the legislative
authority is "in reality a phantom." ' 66

61THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78-83 (A. Hamilton).
" In Hamilton's famous words, the courts themselves exercise "neither FORCE
NOR WILL but merely judgment" and are, of all the branches, the "least dangerous
to the political rights of the Constitution." Tim FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (A. Hamilton). In this essay Hamilton anticipates the argument, and much of the language, of
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion establishing judicial review in Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), fifteen years later.
65 Tm FEDERALIST No. 79, at 472 (A. Hamilton); see THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A.
Hamilton).
6TE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 484 (A. Hamilton). Hamilton also defends the
creation of lower federal courts (left to the discretion of Congress in art. III) and argues
that the federal Supreme Court should exercise appellate review over the state courts.
Once again, Hamilton anticipates by many years a fundamental decision of the Supreme
Court, this time the opinion of Justice Story in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304 (1816). See Tim FEDERALIST Nos. 81, 82 (A. Hamilton).
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In light of this battery of safeguards, the Federalists believed
that a bill of rights was correctly omitted from the original
Constitution. In the penultimate paper, The Federalist No. 84,
Hamilton emphasizes this point by arguing that a bill of rights
would be unnecessary and even dangerous: the power to invade
fundamental rights is not granted to the federal government and
a bill of rights might seem to acknowledge such a grant by
implication. This argument was not convincing to most,6 and
the Bill of Rights was swiftly added in 1791.
The Federalist concludes on a note of mixed optimism and
uneasiness characteristic of much of the work: "The establishment of a Constitution, in time of profound peace, by the
voluntary consent of a whole people, is a PRODIGY, to the
' 68
completion of which I look forward with trembling anxiety.
Perfection, however, cannot be demanded because, "I never
expect to see a perfect work from imperfect man."' 69 Accordingly, the present draft should be adopted and then improved
over the course of time; a government cannot be perfected in
the abstract without the help of experience. On this point, Hamilton invokes Hume's words: "To balance a large state or society
... on general laws, is a work of so great difficulty that no
human genius, however comprehensive, is able, by the mere dint
of reason and reflection, to effect it. The judgments of many
must unite in the work; EXPERIENCE must guide their la-

bor. ....

"70

In checking the dangers of passion, interest, and

faction, therefore, reason is always in need of assistance from
the lessons of contemporary experience.

III.

Tm FEDERALIST: A VIEw FROM THE PRESENT

Any consideration of the arguments of The Federalistfrom
the vantage point of the present must acknowledge that the
structure of American government and many of its basic presuppositions have changed considerably in the years since 1787.

17See, e.g., Letters from The FederalFarmer, 2 H. STOIUN, supra note 3, at 249;
Essays by a [Maryland] Farmer,5 H. STORING, supra note 3, at 9-16.
61 Tn FEDERAST NO. 85, at 527 (A. Hamilton).
69

Id. at 523.

10Id. at 526.

1988-89]

TBE FEDERALIST PAPERS

First, the system of representation has become more directmore democratic-and less republican in the sense favored by
the Federalists. Since 1913, senators have been elected directly
by the people of the states and not by state legislatures. Thus,
the indirect aspects of senatorial election praised in The Federalist No. 62 have disappeared, although the interests of the
smaller states remain equally represented in the Senate. Similarly,
the "electoral college"-the group of presidential electors whose
deliberate judgment was viewed by Publius in The Federalist
No. 68 as ensuring the choice of superior chief executives-has
become nothing more than a numerical device through which
the popular will in the respective states is registered. The electors
retain no significant discretion of their own. Thus, although the
House of Representatives, Senate, and President continue to be
elected for different terms, all are in effect elected directly by
the people. Correspondingly, the anti-democratic overtones of
The Federalistdo not evoke the same sympathies that they may
have had among a population that had once lived under a
monarchy. Today, for example, the presidential checking power
is frequently justified on the ground that it is more democraticand not less democratic-than the power of the legislature.
Second, while still retaining substantial importance, the states
do not play the significant role that they assumed as quasiindependent sovereignties in 1787. Indeed, the fears of the AntiFederalists that the Constitution would eventually bring about a
consolidated nation have to a substantial extent been realized.
In many respects this result is to be applauded. Slavery, the
great blemish of the Constitution of 1787, was abolished in the
aftermath of the Civil War, and the thirteenth, fourteenth, and
fifteenth amendments granted power to the federal government
that eventually revolutionized its relations with the states. Furthermore, the judicial revolution of the 1930s, which recognized
the centralizing force of a century of industrialization, greatly
reduced the independent authority of the states in Supreme Court
doctrine.
As the authority of the states has declined, the balance of
power within the federal government has also been drastically
realigned. Although it doubtless remains the "least dangerous
branch," the judiciary has gradually assumed a role of power
probably unforeseen even by the Federalists, although such a
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development might well have met with their approval. The greatest change, however, has taken place in the relative strength of
Congress and the executive. Since the Second World War, at
least, it seems to be the executive rather than the legislature that
is sweeping increased power into its "impetuous vortex."' 7 Some
implications of this development will be mentioned at the conclusion.
Another important change in constitutional reality has been
the development (particularly since the New Deal) of independent
administrative agencies and the apparatus of a vast administrative state which exercises a degree of governmental authority
unforeseen in 1787 and combines legislative, executive, and judicial authority in a manner that is arguably inconsistent with
the underlying presuppositions of The FederalistNo. 51.72 Moreover, the development of modern political parties in the 19th
century has also changed the structure of American government,
although it is difficult to see in the massive and ill-organized
Democratic and Republican parties the single-minded "factions"
feared by Publius.
Finally, the Bill of Rights, an institution not included in the
original Constitution and disapproved in The FederalistNo. 84,
has assumed increasing importance in American life and in the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. Most of the guarantees of
these amendments have been held judicially enforceable not only
against the federal government but also against the states through
their "incorporation" into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The fourteenth and fifteenth amendments,
moreover, contain guarantees of equality, which have in effect
functioned as extensions of the Bill of Rights in the jurisprudence
of the Supreme Court. Indeed, the provisions of the Civil War
amendments, particularly the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, have set much of the tone of Supreme Court
litigation in the period since the Second World War.
Some of these changes are perhaps reflected in the role
played by the The Federalistin the jurisprudence of the Supreme

7'

See supra note 39.

72

See supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
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Court in recent decades.7 3 As we have seen, The Federalist is
basically concerned with governmental structure: the internal
organization of the federal government and the relationship of
the federal government to the states. Although a concern for
individual rights certainly lies behind many of the structural
discussions, The Federalist contains no comprehensive analysis
of specific individual rights. Publius rejects the addition of a
Bill of Rights and does not devote a great deal of attention to
the few individual rights that are protected in the original Constitution. Moreover, the authors countenance, if they do not
defend, the institution of slavery. Indeed, personal equality in
general is not of particular concern to the authors of The Federalist, and a number of their arguments assume or approve the
existence of certain forms of social, economic, and even political
inequality. Accordingly, 20th-century struggles over the meaning
of equality-for example, civil rights battles over desegregation,
integration and affirmative action-raise issues that are quite
remote from the authors' preoccupations and concerns. These
are constitutional problems of a later era, as are the issues of
women's rights and abortion, which also occupy a central role
in the contemporary jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. Thus,
the constitutional issues that have absorbed the lion's share of
judicial attention since World War II-equality and a series of
specifically-defined individual rights-generally fall outside the
direct concerns of The Federalist.74
The Federalist, therefore, has its main impact on litigation
concerning governmental structure. But here, too, significant
shifts have taken place in Supreme Court doctrine. Although
constitutional litigation in the Nineteenth Century focused largely
on the relationship of the federal government to the states (thus
mirroring the preoccupations of the Framers), the relative importance of these questions has decreased significantly since the
New Deal revolution of the 1930s. It was during this period that
the Court, for all practical purposes, ceased to impose limits on
Congress's power to enter areas of economic regulation previ-

73 For a comprehensive review, see Wilson, The Most Sacred Text: The Supreme
Court's Use of The Federalist Papers, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REv. 65.
74 Even so, the number of citations of The Federalistin Supreme Court opinions
has shown a generally increasing trend in recent years. See id. at 66.
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ously occupied by the states, thus curtailing a prolific source of
structural litigation.
In the forty years before 1937, for example, the Court actively reviewed exercises of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. Since 1937, in contrast, the Court has only once
invalidated a congressional exercise of the commerce power on
structural grounds. In this case, National League of Cities v.
Usery, 75 the Court struck down a federal statute that regulated
the minimum wages of state employees. Numerous citations of
The Federalistin National League of Cities and its successorsuntil the case was overruled in 1985 76-reflect The Federalist's
concentration on issues of state and federal power. The doctrinal
question in these cases was whether (or the extent to which)
Congress could regulate the economic activities of the state
governments. The underlying dispute, however, was more closely
concerned with the appropriate extent of judicial power. On one
side were justices who believed that the judiciary should intervene in these cases to protect the power of the states.7 7 Other
justices, however, maintained that because the states were well
represented in Congress, the precise allocation of authority should
be left to the political process.7 8 The Federalistwas liberally cited
on both sides of this debate.7 9 After attempting to handle the
complex economic assessments necessary in these cases, without
much success, the Court decided that the judiciary should ordi-

7 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
76 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
See id. at 570-72, 575 n.18, 578 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing TnE FEDEE.UIST
Nos. 7, 11, 17, 22 (A. Hamilton), 39, 42, 45, 46 (J. Madison)); id. at 582 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) (citing THE FEDERALST Nos. 17 (A. Hamilton), 45, 51 (J. Madison));
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 270-71 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing THE
FEDF.RALIST Nos. 45 (J. Madison), 84 (A. Hamilton)); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S.
742, 792-93 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (citing TBE FEDERALIST Nos. 15, 16 (A. Hamilton)); see also Nagel, Federalism as
a Fundamental Value: NationalLeague of Cities in Perspective, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 81
(invoking The Federalistin defense of NationalLeague of Cities decision); see generally
Dry, Federalism and the Constitution: The Founders' Design and Contemporary ConstitutionalLaw, 4 CoNsTrruToNA L COMMENTARY 233 (1987).
78 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551-52 (citing Tan FEDERAST Nos. 43, 46, 62) (J.
Madison)); see also National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 876-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Tn FEDERALIsT Nos. 45, 46 (. Madison)).
71 See supra notes 77-78; Wilson, supra note 73, at 85-89.
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narily not intervene but rather defer to congressional findings. s0
In another area of federal-state relations, however, the Supreme Court has continued to exercise vigorous judicial review.
The Court has continued to decide cases in which Congress has
not affirmatively regulated commerce, but where a state statute
is alleged to invade an area of exclusive federal power. In these
"dormant" commerce clause cases, The Federalistis most often
cited to assert the national interest in commerce unimpeded by
particularistic or parochial state restrictions. 81 In these cases,
however, The Federalist is ordinarily cited in the course of a
general assertion of a very general value, i.e., the federal interest
in commerce; the specific arguments of The Federalist do not
often give any very clear guidance on how these cases should be
decided. 2 Indeed the cited numbers of The Federalistgive only
the most ambiguous support to the questionable doctrine of the
"dormant" commerce clause at all. In a recent opinion, a newlyappointed justice has supported state power by calling into question the entire nationalist doctrine of the "dormant" commerce
clause, remarking that The Federalist praised free trade and
national uniformity in general but "said little of substance spe83
cifically about the Commerce Clause....
'o

Garcia, 469 U.S. 528.

SI See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 448 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting)

(citing Tim FEDERALIST Nos. 11 (A. Hamilton), 42 (J. Madison)); Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 142 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing TBE FEDERALIST Nos. 7, 11, 12 (A. Hamilton), 42 (J. Madison));
see also id. at 151 n.16. For an important pre-war example in this area, see Baldwin v.
G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (J.
Madison)).
For a similar use of The Federalist in cases considering the provision of art. I, §
10, cl.2 of the Constitution, which prohibits the states from taxing imports or exports,
see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534, 555-58 (1959) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) (citing Tn FEDERALIST Nos. 12, 32, 67 (A. Hamilton), 44 (J. Madison)
for the view that the import-export clause reflects the Framers' intention to grant the
federal government exclusive power over foreign commerce). See also Michelin Tire
Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976) (federal government "must speak with one
voice" in regulating foreign trade; citing Tn -EDERALIST Nos. 11, 12 (A. Hamilton),
42, 44 (J.Madison)).
82 When the meaning of an archaic term is in question, however, The Federalist
can be helpful as a specific example of contemporary usage. See, e.g., Michelin Tire
Corp., 423 U.S. at 291-93 n.12 (1976) (invoking Tan FEDERALIST No. 12 (A. Hamilton)
as evidence to show that state ad valorem property tax does not constitute an "impost"
prohibited by art. I, § 10, cl.2).
81 Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington Department of Revenue, 107 S. Ct.
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In contrast with disputes involving federal and state power,
cases considering the allocation of powers within the federal
government-and particularly cases involving the role of the
President-have increased notably in the past two decades. Before the events of the early 1970s-the Vietnam War and the
dramatic fall of the Nixon Administration-cases of this sort

were comparatively rare in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence.
In recent years, however, the Court has decided a number of

extremely important separation of powers cases arising from
extensive assertions of executive power and congressional attempts to restrain that power. In these cases portions of The
Federalist have played a role.
Against the background of their historical experience, the
authors of The Federalist sought to restrain legislative power.

They were challenged to defend the new (and in some ways
monarchical) institution of the presidency and, as we have seen,
The FederalistNos. 67-77 contain a spirited defense of a vigorous chief executive.14 In separation of powers cases, therefore,
The Federalist has been frequently invoked in favor of, rather
than against, strong claims of presidential power 5 When the

2810, 2829 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The Federalisthas also recently played a role in cases considering whether the states
can be sued in federal courts-another problem of federal-state relations. Justices seeking
to extend the immunity of states in federalcourts-as well as justices seeking to restrict
that immunity-have sought support in various numbers of The Federalist. See, e.g.,
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (states are immune under the
eleventh amendment from certain damage actions based on federal discrimination statute)
(majority cites TnE FEDERALIST Nos. 17 (A. Hamilton), 39, 45, 46 (J. Madison) for view
that the Framers endorsed strong state governments; Justice Brennan's dissent invokes
TIm FEDERALIST Nos. 32, 80, 81 (A. Hamilton) in asserting that states possess no
immunity in causes of action based on federal law); Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways
and Public Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987) (eleventh amendment bars admiralty action
against a state) (Justice Powell's opinion cites Tim FEDERALST No. 81 (A. Hamilton)
for view that states are not subject to suit without their consent; Justice Brennan's
dissent invokes Tim FEDERALIST No. 80 (A. Hamilton) to emphasize the strong national
interest in the admiralty jurisdiction.).
For use of The Federalist in an area in which assertions of state "sovereignty" and
individual rights collide, see Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 93 (1985) (Tim FEDERALIST
No. 9 (A. Hamilton) cited in argument that states retain separate "sovereign power,"
and therefore conviction of defendant by two states for the same criminal act does not
violate the double jeopardy clause of fifth amendment).
See supra notes 50-62 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 294 n.24 (1981) (citing Tim FEDERALIST
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Supreme Court struck down the so-called "legislative veto" in
INS v. Chadha,8 6 for example, the majority invoked The Federalist No. 73 in emphasizing the importance of the presidential
veto, an institution thought to be endangered by the device
invalidated by the Court. The Court also cited The Federalist
Nos. 22, 51, and 62 on the importance of bicameralism as a
further check on feared excesses of the legislature. 87 Among the
passages quoted by the Court in Chadha are statements that
88
warn against legislative despotism.
Last term the Court decided another significant separation
of powers case when it upheld legislation that provided for
judicial appointment of "independent counsel" to investigate
and prosecute suspected crimes of members of the executive
branch. 89 In a dissenting opinion that sought to support the
power of the President, Justice Scalia quoted The FederalistNo.
51 on the importance of checking the legislature and "fortifying" the executive, and providing each branch (here, the executive) with adequate tools for its own defense. 9° In arguing that
the independent counsel legislation represents an unconstitutional
usurpation of executive power, Justice Scalia also cited Madison
in The FederalistNos. 47 and 49 and Hamilton in The Federalist
Nos. 70, 73, 78, and 81. 91
Yet not all citations of The Federalisthave favored presidential power. The FederalistNo. 47 argues, for example, that the
separation of governmental powers need not be rigidly main-

No. 64 (J. Jay) in asserting broad presidential authority over foreign affairs); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 n.17 (1974) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (J. Jay)
in asserting "a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications"); Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 507 n.2, 511 n.6 (1977) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (J. Madison) in arguing that a statute providing
for seizure of President Nixon's papers threatens the independence of the President).
- 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
17 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 948-50.
n See id. at 949 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (A. Hamilton)); see also id. at
948 (citing TnE FEDERALIST No. 73 (A. Hamilton)). In a concurring opinion in Chadha,
Justice Powell invoked THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47, 48 (J. Madison) in arguing that the
legislative veto exercised in Chadharepresented legislative infringement on judicialpower.
Id. at 960-62.
19 Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
- Id. at 2622-23, 2625, 2637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
I- Id. at 2622, 2626, 2629, 2634, 2638-39.
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tained and one branch may exercise a portion of another department's power. 92 This language has been invoked-sometimes
successfully, sometimes unsuccessfully-in arguments for congressional authority to regulate or to check functions that, under
a more doctrinaire view, might seem to fall within the executive's
domain. 93
This use of The FederalistNo. 47 to support congressional
limitations on presidential power, by insisting on flexibility rather
than a rigid allocation of authority, bears some resemblance to
the Court's ultimate invocation of The Federalist to uphold
congressional limitations on the states by emphasizing the states'
political ability to protect themselves. 94 In both instances, certain
judges have invoked The Federalistto support flexible congressional authority to define the limits of basic governmental structures, and have left the protection of other political organs (the
president and the states) to the political process rather than the
judiciary.
A contrasting technique, however, is evident in separation
of powers opinions like Chadha that invoke The Federalist's
discussion of an independent executive to support strong judicial
limits on congressional authority when confronted with assertions of presidential power. In these cases, courts have refused
to defer to legislative judgment. Similarly, some judges have
invoked The Federalist's reflections on state power in order to
support judicial authority to assert that power against the national legislature. In these instances, judges have sought to use
The Federalistto support extensive judicial power to elaborate,

92See supra note 36.
11 The Court, for example, cited THm FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison) in upholding
a statute that ordered the seizure of President Nixon's papers in Nixon v. Administrator
of General Services, 433 U.S. at 442 n.5; see Wilson, supra note 73, at 92; see also
Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2620. Justice White's dissent in Chadha also invoked Tm
FEDERAIST No. 47 (J. Madison) in arguing that executive power could be checked by
the "legislative veto"; in advancing this view, White emphasized that "the history of
the separation-of-powers doctrine is also a history of accommodation and practicality."
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 999.
94 See supra text accompanying notes 78-80; see also Quint, The Separation of
Powers and Judicial Review at the End of the Reagan Era, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
(forthcoming).
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define, and enforce constitutional controls on the powers of
Congress. 95
Thus, these structural decisions-allocating power between
the federal government and the states and among the branches
of the federal government-often boil down to a question of
whether the courts should defer to Congress in drawing lines for
the precise allocation of power or whether they should attempt
to allocate governmental power themselves. 96 Because The Federalist largely speaks in terms of a clash of political power,
however, it has little to say about the precise extent of the

judicial role in assisting the political branches, or the states, in
the task of self-protection. Moreover, allocation of power among

governments and branches of government involves the examination and assessment of vast and intricate political institutions
that have changed far beyond anything that the authors of The
Federalist could have known. These extensive changes make

91 Similar arguments have also been made in cases involving congressional experiments with the judiciary. As we have seen, the concluding numbers of THE FEDERALIST
were written in praise of a federal judiciary that was protected, through life tenure and
assured salaries, against incursions by the other branches. See supra notes 63-66 and
accompanying text. These essays have recently been invoked by justices seeking to limit
congressional power to establish courts or other adjudicatory bodies that lack the special
judicial protections of article III. See Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50, 58-60, 86-87 n.39 (1982) (plurality opinion) (non-Article III bankruptcy
courts unconstitutional under certain circumstances) (citing THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78-82
(A. Hamilton)); Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 86061 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (seeking to limit the adjudicatory functions of
administrative agency) (citing TrE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton)); see also United
States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 704, 712-13 n.10 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(arguing that facts supporting admissibility of confession must be found by article III
judge rather than by federal magistrate) (citing Trn FEDERALIST Nos. 78, 79 (A. Hamilton)); Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 417-18 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(arguing that District of Columbia judges must be appointed in accordance with article
III) (citing Tut FEDERALIST No. 79 (A. Hamilton)); cf. United States v. Will, 449 U.S.
200, 218, 220 (1980) (invalidating certain reductions of salaries of federal judges) (Tit
FEDERALIST No. 79 (A. Hamilton) cited as evidence of Framers' interest in protecting
judicial compensation).
In a number of these opinions, justices favoring a more rigid interpretation of the
separation of powers have cited The Federalist's advocacy of independent courts to
support judicial limitations on congressional extension of certain judicial functions to
other organs. In so doing, they are responding to other justices who are willing to
acknowledge a larger scope for legislative experimentation in this area.
96 See generally J. CHOPER, JUDIcIAL RWviaw AND TE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980).
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specific use of The Federalistin this context even more problematic. Indeed, although we use the same words as the authors of
The Federalist-"congress," "president," "states"-the things
to which those words now refer would be almost unrecognizable
to the political authors of 1788. Thus, when The Federalist is
invoked in litigation over governmental structure, it is primarily
useful as an indicator of very general propositions, rather than
yielding helpful advice on specific results in a contemporary
setting. Moreover, because of the changing focus of Supreme
Court doctrine, The Federalistis not of direct relevance to many
of the major issues of contemporary constitutional litigation: on
questions of individual rights, where historical change might not
be quite so important, The Federalist provides only scattered
commentary, in contrast with the sustained analysis of govern97
mental structure that forms the main focus of the work.
IV.

PASSION, REASON, AND EXPERIENCE IN THE FEDERALIST
TODAY

The Constitution of the United States is now 200 years old,
and The Federalisthas also reached that age. As is also true of
the debates in the Constitutional Convention, these essays respond to historical circumstances that are in many important
ways quite different from our own. It is therefore not surprising
that the text of The Federalist does not yield very clear answers
to specific questions of contemporary constitutional interpreta-

9 See supra text accompanying note 74. Interestingly, in at least one area in which
The Federalist is relevant on specific questions of individual rights, there may also be
some uncertainty about the implications of the discussion for the scope of judicial
power. In Tim FEDERALIST Nos. 10 and 51, Madison emphasized the importance of a
multiplicity of religious sects as a guarantee of religious liberty, and two recent Supreme
Court decisions have adopted this theme, albeit with somewhat differing emphases. In
one case, The Federalist was invoked to support judicial power to further religious
diversity by invalidating a charitable solicitation statute that seemed to favor prosperous,
well-established religious groups over small and less well-favored denominations. Larson
v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245 (1982) (citing Tim FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison)). In a
second decision, however, the Court indicated that the clash of religious interests seeking
various advantages must be relegated to the political process. Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Association, 108 S. Ct. 1319, 1327 (1988) (citing THm FEDERALIST
No. 10 (J. Madison)). Perhaps these cases may be reconciled on the ground that the
solicitation statute struck down in Larson may have unduly curtailed the ability of some
groups to participate adequately in the political process.
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tion. In this respect The Federalist-alongwith other historical
materials arising from the adoption and ratification of the Constitution-will most likely play a somewhat different role than
similar materials relating to the adoption of those modern constitutions whose provisions were drafted and enacted within living memory.
It is as a more general work of political analysis that The
Federalistmaintains its contemporary value. The Federalistis a
"text that has not yet lost its hold on the legal mind' '98-or on
the "political mind" either-and an understanding of contemporary political culture may be deepened by exploring the extent
to which certain central theories of The Federalistare borne out
in modern political life. One might examine, for example, the
extent to which Madison was correct in believing that an extended territory and population inhibits the oppressive effects of
faction.9 Perhaps the American civil rights legislation of the
1960s can be seen as a vindication (albeit belated) of that theory.
The faction of segregationists was powerful enough to control a
number of state governments but, ultimately, not powerful
enough to control the government of the United States.' °° The
great multiplicity of religious sects throughout the United States
certainly contributes to a high degree of religious liberty, a result
specifically foreseen by Madison in The Federalist No. 51.10
Other examples can probably be adduced. On the other hand,
it may be that modern methods of communication-particularly
television-can so unify the population, and so reduce the practical problems of concerted action, that the original strength of
Madison's argument is reduced to a large extent in the contemporary context. Perhaps these factors can convert even a large
and diverse population into one in which an oppressive "common passion or interest will . . . be felt by a majority of the
02
whole."
" Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J.
1013, 1016 (1984).
See TBE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison); supra text accompanying notes 2021.
21. See Dellinger, supra note 42, at 159-60. The eradication of slavery through civil

war could also possibly be viewed in this light. D. EPsTmN, supra note 25, at 105.
01 TBE FEDERAisT No. 51, at 324 (J. Madison).
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No. 10, at 81 (J. Madison); see Wright, supra note 6, at 25-
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A related question is the extent to which the economic and
social "virtual representation" of The Federalist No. 35103 has
worked in practice. Certainly, given the great size of the states
and congressional districts, it is very difficult for a person whose
life has been spent in typical (non-professional) occupations of
the vast majority of citizens to be elected to national office.
Hamilton believed that members of the "learned professions"
would mediate between "classes of citizens,"1 4 but it is at least
questionable that the lawyers who make up a significant portion
of Congress are actually well equipped to perform that task.
Whether years of prosperous professional activity followed by
life in the District of Columbia will effectively dilute a representative's understanding of his or her constituents, or whether the
requirements of re-election will be sufficient to reinforce the
"chords of sympathy"105 existing between voter and representative, are contemporary questions that are very sharply raised by
the argument of The FederalistNo. 35.
Behind these more specific problems and resolutions, however, lie more general theoretical themes, and it is these aspects
of the work that are most likely to enrich our contemporary
understanding. °6 Although the United States today little resembles the agrarian nation of less than four million inhabitants
that clustered along the Atlantic seaboard in 1787, certain basic
views on human nature and political life may be of common
value in both periods. Accordingly, I would like to return to a
fundamental aspect of The Federalist-anaspect that is perhaps
not significantly affected by the accidents of place or time-and
try to suggest some ways in which the views of The Federalist
on human nature and the force of reason should most properly
be understood today. As we have seen, The Federalistholds that
human nature in politics is profoundly flawed and that this flaw
may give rise to an "impetuous" seeking after power in indivi-

,01See supra text accompanying notes 27-30.

10,TBE

FEDERALIST

No. 35, at 216 (A. Hamilton).

105Id.
106 Recent commentators, for example, have employed basic doctrines of The Federalist in seeking to explain prominent features of American public law. See Ackerman,
supra note 98; Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 ST.
L. REv. 29

(1985).
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duals and "factions" and also in the holders of governmental
office. 7 At the basis of politics, therefore, lies the paradox of
The Federalist No. 51: the government must have adequate
"energy" to further the happiness of the people and protect
individual rights, but the government must also be obliged to
control itself. 08 It is the task of reason and experience to accomplish this end, and Publius appeared to believe-perhaps with
some degree of hesitation-that the task might indeed be accomplished.
Under the circumstances of 1787, it seemed to the authors
of The Federalistthat it was the legislative power-the principal
power in a republic-that posed the most immediate dangers of
abuse. In The FederalistNo. 48 Madison paints a vivid picture
of the legislature "everywhere extending the sphere of its activity
and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex."' 9 This picture
is based on events in the states following the Revolution, and,
drawing on that experience, Madison suggests that legislative
encroachments are inherent in representative government and
that the exercise of reason should therefore be directed toward
limiting that power. The executive is less dangerous, "being
restrained within a narrower compass and being more simple in
its nature";" 0 indeed, the executive is "carefully limited, both
in the extent and the duration of its power.""' A political lesson
of The Federalist might therefore be-as the Supreme Court's
citations of The Federalist in the Chadha case suggest" 2 -that
the legislature is the branch that must be most sedulously controlled.
Yet the authors of The Federalist were not only philosophers
but also practical individuals, many of whose doctrinal views
were based ultimately on the lessons of history and experience."'
As Hamilton emphasizes in the closing passages of the work,
reason is an essential tool, but it also has its weaknesses, and

'07 See supra notes 6-10, 37-41, 56-62 and accompanying text.
' THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (J. Madison).
FEDERALIST No. 48, at 309 (J. Madison).

119THE

110Id. at 310.
M'Id. at 309.
MzSee supra text accompanying notes 86-88.
"I See, e.g., Wright, supra note 6, at 2-3.
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these weaknesses can only be supplemented by the lessons of
4 This point suggests that now-more than two hunexperience. 11
dred years after The Federalist was written-an understanding
of its implications for contemporary political life can only be
gained through a careful, continuing examination of contemporary "experience." Rather than any specific device to curb the
passion for power arising out of the events and vicissitudes of
1787, it is The Federalist'sunderlying view of human nature and
the need to curb it by the force of reason that remains. Precisely
how that principle is to be understood in any specific period
rests on a contemporary understanding of that period's own
political experience. The experience in the states after 1776 may
indeed have suggested that, in a republic, the executive's power
tends to be fragile. If contemporary experience tells us, however,
that the national executive no longer seems "restrained within a
narrower compass"-if the executive's "more simple" nature
has expanded over time into a vast and complex establishment,
and if it, more than the contemporary legislature, seems inspired
"with an intrepid confidence in its own strength "I'--the lessons
of The Federalist under contemporary circumstances may well
be to seek the dangers of passion and encroachment where they
now lie, and to exercise the strength of reason and experience
to meet those contemporary dangers.
Indeed, in the post-War period in the United States, it seems
clear that it is the President and the entire executive branch,
rather than the Congress, that have assumed the most extensive
power in the governmental structure." 6 The'executive origins of
the Vietnam War, the Watergate affair, and now the exposure
of presidential and executive actions relating to sales of arms to
Iran and possibly illegal covert aid to the Nicaraguan "Contras"
are only the most evident manifestations of the extraordinary
expansion of executive power in the decades following World

"4 See supra text accompanying note 70.
"I Tba FEDERALIST No. 48, at 309 (J.Madison).
116In this respect Jefferson's remarks in 1789 seem

prophetic: "The tyranny of the

legislatures is the most formidable dread at present, and will be for long years. That of
the executive will come in its turn, but it will be at a remote period." 14 PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFRSON 661 (Boyd ed. 1958) (letter to James Madison, March 15, 1789).
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War 11.117 In foreign affairs, particularly, the extent of executive
power is most clearly evident, and it is in this area that concerns
of international relations and international law intersect with the
internal separation of governmental powers under the American
Constitution. The "reflagging" of Kuwaiti ships in the Persian
Gulf in 1987 is only one recent example of the broad power of
the executive to commit the United States to policies that may
involve war, without the affirmative authorization of Congress.
In this light, the more basic doctrine of The Federalistemphasizing the weaknesses of human nature that make it unwise
to concentrate power unduly in any governmental branch-may
favor restraint of the executive rather than the legislature, under
present circumstances, and counsel that the resources of reason
and experience be directed toward that end. Reacting to the
experience of the Nixon presidency, Congress in the 1970s did
seek to impose some limitations on the executive through legislation concerning war powers and budget processes as well as
through increased use of the legislative veto. In the Chadha case
the Supreme Court, citing The Federalist, found the legislative
veto unconstitutional; l " on the other hand, the Court has upheld
legislation authorizing "independent counsel" for the investigation of the executive branch." 9 At the commencement of the
third century of the Constitution, one pressing task for American
jurists may be to develop a deeper understanding of the causes
of the continuing expansion of executive power and to employ
the forces of reason and experience to re-create a more equitable
balance among the political departments of the American government.

"IFor a general discussion, see Quint, The Separation of Powers Under Nixon:
Reflections on ConstitutionalLiberties and the Rule of Law, 1981 DUKE L.J. 1; Quint,
The Separation of Powers Under Carter, 62 TEx. L. REv. 785 (1984). On the IranContra affair, see, e.g., Schlesinger, The Constitution and PresidentialLeadership, 47
MD. L. REv. 54 (1987).
M'See supra text accompanying notes 86-88.
119See supra text accompanying note 89.

